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Tougher Than the Rest? Relationship between Unemployment
and Crime in Croatia
Abstract
In this paper, the relationship between unemployment and crime is analysed.
A panel of 20 Croatian counties over the years 1998-2013 is used to estimate
the effect of unemployment on the rates of various groups of property and
violent crimes. According to the theory of economics of crime, increase in
unemployment leads to higher crime rates. A fixed-effects model, including
time- and county-specific effects and several covariates, is estimated. The re-
sults show there is no impact of unemployment on aggregate property crimes.
For all violent crimes bar rapes, the results oppose the theory and intuition.
The unexpected results are discussed in the context of the Croatian-specific
macro-environment.
Keywords: crime, unemployment, fixed-effects model, panel data
JEL classification: K42, J00, J69
Nezaposlenost i kaznena djela u Hrvatskoj
Sazˇetak
U ovom radu analizira se veza izmedu nezaposlenosti i kriminala. Koriˇsteni
su podaci za 20 hrvatskih zˇupanija od 1998. do 2013. godine kako bi se
procijenio ucˇinak nezaposlenosti na stope razlicˇitih imovinskih i nasilnih kaz-
nenih djela. Prema teoriji ekonomike kriminala, vec´a nezaposlenost vodi do
viˇsih stopa kriminala. Procijenjen je model s fiksnim ucˇincima ukljucˇujuc´i
kontrole za vremenske i zˇupanijske specificˇnosti te niz kovarijata. Rezultati
pokazuju da nema utjecaja nezaposlenosti na agregatnu razinu imovinskih
kaznenih djela. Za nasilna kaznena djela, izuzev kaznenog djela silovanja,
rezultati su obrnuti od teorije i intuicije. Neocˇekivani rezultati diskutirani
su u specificˇnom hrvatskom makrokontekstu.
Kljucˇne rijecˇi: kaznena djela, nezaposlenost, model s fiksnim ucˇincima, panel podaci
JEL klasifikacija: K42, J00, J69

1 Introduction
The theory of economics of crime observes crime as a type of work - an alternative
activity to obtain economic benefits (Becker, 1968). If work and crime are alternative
activities, there exists some return on work (i.e., wage) and return on crime (i.e., loot).
According to the simple model of economics of crime, individuals choose crime if the ex-
pected return from crime minus idiosyncratic psychological cost of committing a crime is
higher than the expected return from work (for more details see Ehrlich, 1973; Edmark,
2005). Consequently, if there is no work, people tend to look more for other sources of
income. Therefore, in this framework, the expected effect of unemployment on crime is
positive: higher unemployment makes more people willing to commit a crime. However,
empirical research on this particular relationship is far less conclusive than suggested by
this theory. There are several reasons why Croatia makes an interesting case study for
testing the theory of economics of crime.
First, in the Great Recession of 2008/2009, Croatia experienced its longest economic
crisis in the last two decades. Gross domestic product shrunk by 13 percent cumula-
tively between 2009 and 2014, while unemployment reached its war and post-war levels.
This economic agony is best depicted in Figure 1. Once the GDP growth dipped into
the negative, it has not recovered since. No other country in Europe has had such a
persistent crisis, which makes the investigation into potential repercussions on crime
rates even more interesting.
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Figure 1: Real GDP Growth Rate and Unemployment Rate in Croatia, 2001-2013
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Croatian Bureau of Statistics and
Croatian Employment Service.
Second, there was substantial variation in the unemployment across the observed period.
In the first three years unemployment rose, followed by constant decline from 2001 to
2008. When the crisis struck, unemployment soared again. These swings are similar to
those in Edmark (2005), and as she notes, they greatly facilitate the identification of
the supposed effects of unemployment on crime. Another potentially important thing
to note is that even in the expansive period of 2001-2008, the unemployment rate never
dipped under 11 percent, which is still considered to be high in Western European coun-
tries as well as in the United States.
Furthermore, this paper tries to overcome some of the limitations from existing em-
pirical studies in this area of research. Unlike cross-country studies, a panel dataset
for 20 counties in one country overcomes problems regarding the differences in defini-
tions of crime, reporting propensities and data collection. Moreover, according to Levitt
(2001), it transcends the weaknesses of time-series analysis of country crime data, by
using the fixed-effects panel data estimation and thus controlling for the unobserved
heterogeneity. The analysis is conducted for both property crimes and violent crimes.
Namely, violent crimes could also be economically motivated, although to a lesser extent.
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Additionally, I further the approach adopted by Edmark (2005) by including sub-category
clear-up rates for all categories of crimes as well as controlling for the number of em-
ployed police officers. Namely, when substantial swings in unemployment are present,
it is possible that the decrease in unemployment is accompanied by an increase in the
number of employed police force and therefore a surge in crime reporting propensities
and vice versa. Besides, a larger police force could have a sufficient discouraging psycho-
logical impact on criminals even without the effective changes in reporting propensities
or clear-up rates and therefore should be included in the analysis.
The results show there is no significant impact of unemployment on aggregate property
crimes. However, they suggest that a rise in unemployment has an impact on burglary
and grand larceny. It is important to note here that under Croatian criminal law, bur-
glary is actually a sub-category of grand larceny. Consequently, a positive significant
effect of unemployment is found for only one type of property crimes. The results for
violent crimes are similar to those presented by Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), i.e.,
counter-intuitive with negative signs for all violent crimes bar rapes.
The obtained results are discussed in the context of the country-specific environment:
consistently high unemployment and long-term unemployment rates in Croatia, along
with a strong family safety-net, alleviate the impact of unemployment on crime. I posit
that because of these specific systemic conditions, the variation in crime rates can pre-
dominantly be explained by the psychological cost of committing a crime rather than
unemployment or any of the used covariates.
The next section discusses previous findings about the impact of unemployment on
crime. The third section presents the gathered data and methodological approach. In
the fourth section, the results of estimations are presented and discussed. The final
section concludes.
2 Unemployment and Crime
The vast majority of empirical research on the unemployment and crime nexus is con-
ducted on United States data (Britt, 1994; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Gould
et al., 2002; Lin, 2008; Phillips and Land, 2012). Britt (1994) investigates the relation-
ship for youth population in the US by using a time-series analysis. He finds support for
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the impact of opportunity effect of current unemployment on criminal activity and for
the impact of prolonged unemployment on property crime. Raphael and Winter-Ebmer
(2001) and Lin (2008) both use the instrumental variables method to estimate the im-
pact of unemployment on property crimes and find significantly positive effects. Gould
et al. (2002) examine the degree to which changes in crime rates can be explained by
changes in the labour market opportunities for those most likely to commit a crime, i.e.,
less-educated men. They find that crime rates are significantly determined by wages and
unemployment rates of less-educated males. Phillips and Land (2012) also find support
for a positive relationship between unemployment and property crimes.
One can conclude that the connection between unemployment and crime is fairly robust
in the United States. However, the question remains whether these results can be gener-
alized to other geographic, cultural and economic entities. For Europe there is a shortage
of empirical work on this topic, probably due to the lack of suitable datasets. Still, a
few exceptions are worth mentioning. Entorf and Spengler (2000) use a rich dataset
for Germany, but provide weaker support for the relationship between unemployment
and crime than the studies conducted in the US. Their estimates for West Germany are
even negative for some theft crimes. Carmichael and Ward (2001), Edmark (2005) and
Fouge`re et al. (2009) all find significant impacts of unemployment on crime in England
and Wales, Sweden and France, respectively. Altindag (2012) provides the most com-
prehensive study of this relationship for Europe to date, and finds a positive influence
of unemployment on property crimes. His study covers 33 countries in the period 1996-
2003.
Lee (2009) argues that the relationship between unemployment and crime is generally
ambiguous. Moreover, it depends on the apprehension rate, which suggests that the
effect of unemployment on crime would vary across different legal systems and cultures.
Therefore, it is sensible to assume that the unemployment-crime nexus could differ sig-
nificantly across different parts of the world.
Research that depicts this connection in a South European, Mediterranean state en-
vironment is scarce. Strong family connections in the Mediterranean countries (Kohli
et al., 2005) could have non-negligible effect on the unemployment-crime relationship.
A family safety-net might serve as a shock absorber after a person loses his/her job
or is looking for a job longer than initially anticipated and therefore the spillover from
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unemployment to crime as suggested by theory might be delayed or even non-existent.
Saridakis and Spengler (2012) provide evidence for deterrence of property crimes due
to higher clear-up rates and for positive impact of unemployment on property crimes.
They find no support for these relationships when violent crimes are used as depen-
dent variables. Buonanno (2006) fails to provide evidence of the relationship between
unemployment and crime when not accounting for the difference between South and
North Italy. His findings show that the relationship between unemployment and crime
predicted by theory holds only for South Italy. Buonanno and Montolio (2008) provide
evidence for larger pertinence of socioeconomic variables in comparison with unemploy-
ment for Spain.
This paper examines the effects of unemployment on crime in Croatia using county
panel data for the period 1998-2013. While being a Mediterranean state, Croatia is
also a post-transition economy. Research into the unemployment-crime nexus in post-
transition countries is, to the best of my knowledge, non-existent. Consequently, this
paper contributes to the existing literature about the relationship between unemploy-
ment and crime in two areas where research is deficient.
3 Data and Methodological Approach
The data are gathered for 20 Croatian counties in the period 1998-2013. Croatia ac-
tually has 21 counties, but data are gathered according to county police departments.
Consequently, the County of Zagreb and City of Zagreb are aggregated into one county
for the purpose of this analysis, since the Zagreb police department has both of them
under its jurisdiction. Unemployment data are collected from the Croatian Employment
Service. Crime data are not officially published and were obtained from the Ministry
of the Interior, which is the official crime statistics provider in Croatia. The data for
covariates are gathered from Croatian Bureau of Statistics publications and 2001 and
2011 population censuses. A summary of the gathered data is in Table 1.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Crime Rates and Covariates
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Aggregate property crimes 320 64.522 41.785 11.651 248.178
Burglary 320 34.360 22.656 5.709 142.141
Robbery 320 1.462 1.563 0.000 10.369
Grand larceny 320 37.446 24.506 6.058 147.763
Theft 320 25.613 17.656 3.861 103.468
Aggregate violent crimes 320 3.214 0.925 0.699 6.893
Murder1 320 0.503 0.254 0.000 1.863
Rape2 318 0.248 0.172 0.000 1.225
Serious injury 320 2.465 0.831 0.350 5.760
Unemployment 320 764.954 229.348 255.942 1,263.343
Unemployment (female) 320 421.523 125.690 166.478 685.994
Aggregate property clear-up 320 0.425 0.109 0.148 0.814
Burglary clear-up 320 0.403 0.107 0.145 0.841
Robbery clear-up 317 0.644 0.254 0.000 3.000
Grand larceny clear-up 320 0.409 0.107 0.148 0.808
Theft clear-up 320 0.442 0.135 0.136 0.848
Aggregate violent clear-up 320 0.953 0.049 0.769 1.048
Murder clear-up 318 0.979 0.110 0.000 1.667
Rape clear-up 295 0.951 0.164 0.000 2.000
Serious injury clear-up 320 0.948 0.059 0.717 1.059
Infant mortality 320 0.606 0.653 0.000 11.145
Divorces 320 10.244 2.976 3.019 22.114
Police officers 320 49.420 17.849 25.916 105.329
Drug abuse 320 16.923 13.107 2.250 78.345
Average income3 320 40.349 8.691 22.638 58.948
Tourist overnight 320 125,219.700 206,075.900 584.437 955,390.100
Note: All variables except clear-up rates are expressed as number per 10,000 inhabitants
where number of inhabitants is obtained from 2001 and 2011 censuses.
Sources: Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Croatian Employment Service and Ministry of
the Interior.
There are a few important remarks about the data presented in Table 1. First, N is
not equal for all clear-up rates because in some counties there were cases where there
were zero reported and zero solved crimes. Therefore, clear-up rates could not be com-
puted. Second, for some crime categories, the clear-up rate exceeds 1 (100 percent)
1Includes executed and attempted murder crimes.
2Includes executed and attempted rape crimes.
3Net wage deflated by CPI.
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which points to two possible scenarios: (i) in the years in which this occurs, some old
crimes from previous periods were solved, or (ii) there were errors in data collection.
Regardless of the source of this unusual occurrence, there is no reason to believe that
the influence of these cases is high enough to change the results of the conducted analysis.
Based on the theory and previous research (Levitt, 2001; Edmark, 2005), but with cer-
tain limitations with regards to availableness of the data, several covariates are chosen.
As mentioned in the previous section, clear-up rates for each category of crime serve as
proxy for the probability of getting caught. This approach is more precise than using
the aggregate clear-up rate as control because it approximates the probability of getting
caught for a certain crime. The number of police officers is obtained from the Ministry
of the Interior (the data are not available to the general public) and is also included
as control for the reasons stated in the previous section. Average income is an impor-
tant control variable ensuring that the estimated unemployment coefficient measures
the effect on the supply of crime because income level impacts the demand for crime -
in wealthier regions there is more potential loot. Another control variable that is non-
existent in the current literature is tourist overnight visits. Croatia is a popular tourist
destination, especially in the coastal region which consists of seven counties. Tourist
visits could have impact principally on the demand for crime (more loot), but some-
times also on the supply (specifically, when alcohol consumption on vacation exceeds
a certain threshold). It is therefore important to control for this factor because seven
coastal regions and the Capital (Zagreb) have significantly more tourist visits than the
other counties. Drug abuse crimes are included as a covariate for obvious reasons. Infant
mortality and divorces are included due to data availability issues of other demographic
variables.
As mentioned in the introduction, to control for the unobserved heterogeneity, the fixed-
effects panel model is estimated in the form of:
Crimeit = αi + τt + β1Unemploymentit + β
′Xit + it, (1)
where αi and τt represent county and time-specific effects, respectively, it is the error
term, and Xit is the matrix of the covariates listed above. The main interest of the paper
lies in estimating β1, i.e., the effect of unemployment on crime. The possibility that
this relationship suffers from reverse causality is discussed extensively in the literature.
High crime rates in one area could have negative influence on the establishment of new
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companies and consequently put restraint on employment. However, all empirical studies
that try to tackle this problem by using the instrumental variables approach (Raphael
and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Lin, 2008; Altindag, 2012) find support for a causal direction
from unemployment to crime. Moreover, in all studies, 2SLS estimated coefficients are
higher than in OLS regressions. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the results of
fixed-effects estimation reflect a causal direction from unemployment to crime.
4 Empirical Findings and Discussion
This section reports on the results of the analysis. First, property crimes are depicted,
followed by an analysis of violent crimes. The exposition of baseline results is followed
by sensitivity analysis which serves to test the robustness of the obtained results from
the baseline specification. Previous studies use mostly log-linear or log-log specifications
of the models. Here, the latter approach is adopted.
4.1 Property Crimes
The baseline specification results are reported in Table 2. No significant effect of unem-
ployment on aggregate property crimes is found. According to this estimation, unem-
ployment has a positive and significant impact on burglary and grand larceny. However,
since under Croatian criminal law burglary is a sub-category of grand larceny, unemploy-
ment has an expected effect on only one category of property crimes. When unemploy-
ment per 10, 000 inhabitants increases by 1 percent, burglary and grand larceny increase
by approximately 0.4 percent. This effect is robust across different specifications.
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Table 2: Results of Baseline Specification for Property Crimes
Dependent variable:
Total property Robbery Burglary Grand larceny Theft
Unemployment 0.1444 −0.0931 0.4260∗∗∗ 0.4187∗∗∗ −0.2015
(0.1324) (0.1115) (0.1468) (0.1495) (0.1595)
Clear-up rate −0.4421 −0.0753 0.0598 −0.0394 −0.9613∗∗∗
(0.2851) (0.0962) (0.3201) (0.3222) (0.3660)
Infant mortality −0.0626 −0.0161 −0.1402∗ −0.1427∗ 0.0581
(0.0712) (0.0610) (0.0851) (0.0823) (0.0654)
Divorces 0.1173∗ 0.1748∗∗ 0.1322 0.1484∗∗ 0.0663
(0.0613) (0.0730) (0.0873) (0.0742) (0.0593)
Police −0.3008 0.1357 −0.5495∗ −0.5178∗ −0.0413
(0.2123) (0.2353) (0.2912) (0.2870) (0.2100)
Drug abuse 0.0736 −0.0038 0.1393∗∗ 0.1327∗∗ −0.0188
(0.0543) (0.0359) (0.0631) (0.0651) (0.0458)
Average income −1.0750 2.1800∗∗∗ −1.0740 −0.9609 −1.2470∗
(0.8160) (0.5754) (1.0200) (1.1690) (0.7454)
Tourist overnight 0.1044 −0.0496 0.1783∗∗ 0.1738∗∗ 0.0266
(0.0692) (0.0381) (0.0832) (0.0808) (0.0703)
Observations 320 317 320 320 320
Adjusted R2 0.1011 0.0836 0.1825 0.1791 0.0651
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%,
∗∗∗significant at 1%. Fixed effects and year dummies are included in all specifications.
The hypotheses that all fixed effects are equal to zero and that all time effects are equal
to zero are rejected for all specifications. For robbery, an unbalanced panel is estimated
because for three years it was impossible to compute the clear-up rates due to unavailable
data.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Croatian
Employment Service and Ministry of the Interior.
The clear-up rate, i.e., probability of getting caught is seemingly important only for theft
crimes, and has a large effect of −0.96. This makes sense because under the Croatian
Criminal Code4, Article 216, theft entails stealing an item in order to unlawfully obtain
it, if the value of the stolen item is low. Since the expected return from crime can be
written as5:
E(Wb) = (1− p)Wb + p(Wb − S), (2)
4Croatian Criminal Code (Official Gazette No. 125/11).
5For more details see Edmark (2005).
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where p is probability of getting caught and S is the cost of punishment; when p in-
creases, Wb should also increase in order to compensate for the loss of expected return.
When Wb is low with an upper threshold, which is the case with theft, obviously p plays
a pivotal role in deciding whether to commit a crime.
The number of police officers has a large negative impact on burglary and grand larceny
at the 10 percent significance level which justifies the inclusion of this variable into the
analysis of the unemployment and crime nexus. The negative sign provides support
for the theory that a larger police force intimidates the criminals and results in lower
property crime rates.
Average income has a strong positive effect on robbery and negative on theft. This could
stem again from the fact that theft entails low value, so higher wages reduce the need
for obtaining small illegitimate benefits. On the other hand, the high positive coefficient
on robbery probably points to the demand side of crime. Generally, wages are higher in
wealthier counties, so expected return from crime is larger, leading to stronger incentives
for committing a robbery. Tourist overnight stays have a positive impact again only on
burglary and grand larceny; with the expected sign.
As suggested by Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), county-specific time trends should
be included in the regression to test the sensitivity of the results. The same approach is
used by Edmark (2005). This is called a random-trend model, as each county is allowed
to have its own time trend because an individual-specific trend is an additional source
of heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2010).
In line with this, models from Table 2 are next specified as:
Crimeit = αi + τt + β1Unemploymentit + β
′Xit + ψitimet + ωitime2t + it. (3)
All models are again estimated using the log-log specification. The results of the estima-
tion of the above equation are given in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3. Column 2 includes
only the linear trend, while column 3 includes both linear and quadratic trends. The
results suggest stability of the results presented in Table 2. The coefficient of unemploy-
ment on grand larceny (and burglary) varies between 0.4 and 0.5, while unemployment
has no significant effect on any other crime.
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Table 3: Effect of Unemployment on Property Crimes, Sensitivity Analysis
Model:
Crime Baseline Linear Linear and quadratic
Aggregate property 0.1444 0.0717 0.2213
(0.1324) (0.1372) (0.1372)
Robbery −0.0931 −0.0717 −0.1245
(0.1115) (0.1063) (0.1128)
Burglary 0.4260∗∗∗ 0.3436∗∗∗ 0.4994∗∗∗
(0.1468) (0.1539) (0.1539)
Grand larceny 0.4187∗∗∗ 0.3356∗∗∗ 0.4902∗∗∗
(0.1495) (0.1568) (0.1568)
Theft −0.2015 −0.2422 −0.1027
(0.1595) (0.1702) (0.1702)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗significant at 10%,
∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%. Fixed effects and year dum-
mies are included in all specifications. The hypotheses that all fixed
effects are equal to zero and that all time effects are equal to zero are
rejected for all specifications. All estimations include the same set of
covariates as the baseline specification.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Croatian Bureau of
Statistics, Croatian Employment Service and Ministry of the Interior.
The results for property crimes show a positive effect of unemployment on crime (as
predicted by theory) only for burglary and grand larceny. Again, considering that bur-
glary is a sub-category of grand larceny, the effect was found for only one category of
property crimes. The size of the effect depends on the specification, but varies between
0.3 and 0.5. While statistical significance is clear, the main interest lies in determining
the economic significance of the estimated effect. If a value from baseline specification
of 0.42 is taken, it means that, on average, 1 percent increment in unemployment per
10,000 inhabitants is related to 16 more grand larcenies per 10,000 inhabitants. As
shown in Figure 1, swings in unemployment of nearly 10 percent were almost a common
occurrence in the observed period. Therefore, the results suggest that common changes
in unemployment result in substantial changes in grand larceny rates. The size of this
effect roughly corresponds to the one estimated by Saridakis and Spengler (2012) and
is significantly larger than effects on other property crime estimated by Edmark (2005).
The question which remained unanswered is why are the other property crimes seem-
ingly unaffected by unemployment? The answer is two-fold.
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The first argument is based on the distinction between the supply and demand side
of crime. Unemployment decreases interaction between people. It therefore decreases
demand for personal robbery, and could cancel any positive effects of unemployment on
the supply side of crime. The same explanation is given by Edmark (2005). However, for
theft, probably the most plausible argument is the one used to explain the considerable
effect of its clear-up rate: low value, i.e., low expected return on crime.
The second is the omitted variable argument. Decision to commit a crime is summarised
as (Edmark, 2005):
cn < [(1− p)(Wb) + p(Wb − S)]− [(1− u)W + uA], (4)
where cn is psychological cost of committing a crime, the left parenthesis is expected
return from crime and the right parenthesis expected return from honest work. Hence,
as long as the right side of the equation is larger, individuals will choose crime. I posit
that, in Croatia, cn is very large on average and therefore it is less likely that a change
in unemployment (u) will have an impact on the decision whether to commit a crime.
There are several arguments behind this reasoning. When looking at R2 of all the re-
gressions estimated, the largest is in the specification with linear and quadratic trends
(0.32). In comparison, Edmark (2005) obtains an R2 of 0.73-0.95 for property crimes,
Fouge`re et al. (2009) 0.70-0.95, and Lin (2008) 0.92-0.97. These are all markedly differ-
ent than those in the conducted estimation on Croatian data. All studies use somewhat
different sets of covariates but obtain similar results with regards to the goodness of fit
measure, i.e., R2. This suggests that, while unemployment might have an impact on
some categories of property crimes, the main determinant of crime rates, cn, is unob-
served ; and as such cannot be estimated precisely.
There are several possible explanations for the weak explanatory power of unemployment
for property crimes and/or potentially considerable impact of unobserved psychological
cost of committing a crime. First, Croatia as a Mediterranean country has a developed
family safety-net which serves as a shock absorber for the unemployed. The average age
of leaving the parental home is 31 years, the highest in the EU-28, the average being
26.2 years. Young unemployed people live with their parents until they get a job and
stand properly on their feet. Second, unskilled labour force traditionally migrates to
Western Europe, mainly Germany (Bjelajac, 2007) looking for a better life standard.
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This historical fact could be another factor mitigating the impact of inability to find a
job on committing a crime.
Third, Croatia had relatively high unemployment rates even when economy was growing
at a decent pace from 2003 to 2007. For example, based on Eurostat data, the average
annual unemployment rate in the period 2003-2007 was 12.5 percent, with an EU-28
average of 8.6. Only Slovakia and Poland had higher average unemployment rates in
the pre-crisis period. Looking at the next period, i.e., 2008-2014, the average Croatian
unemployment rate is 13.4 in comparison with the EU-28 average of 9.6 percent. In
this period, only Greece, Spain and Latvia had higher average levels of unemployment.
This simple glance at data suggests that in comparison with its European counterparts,
Croatia is standing still, and while it had substantial swings in unemployment in the
observed period, it was never even close to the low unemployment levels of developed
Western economies. Hence, high unemployment is a characteristic entrenched in the
roots of Croatian economy and not a temporary deviation as in Edmark (2005). Perhaps
the unemployment and crime relationship should also be observed in this context. People
might simply get used to the high unemployment environment and accept that the job
search will probably last for some time. Indeed, Croatia has the highest long-term
unemployment of all new member states in the EU, with only Spain and Greece having
higher rates. Another fact that supports this theory is that in the period 2009-2014 the
mean of aggregate property crimes in Croatia was actually lower by almost 11 percent
in comparison with the pre-crisis period of 2003-2008. Obviously, the sharp increase
in unemployment and deep and persistent recession did not have a detrimental impact
on crime rates as one might have expected. Next, I proceed with the estimation of the
impact of unemployment on violent crimes.
4.2 Violent Crimes
The empirical strategy for this section is identical as described above, except violent
crime rates are used as dependent variables. The results are depicted in Table 4. Un-
employment has a significant negative effect on aggregate violent crimes, murders and
serious body injuries, and a significant positive effect on rapes. These somewhat counter-
intuitive results are similar to those presented by Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001),
the difference being that they obtain a negative coefficient even for rape crimes. As they
note, this might have something to do with the greater frequency of interactions between
potential victims and criminals when larger proportion of the population is employed.
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To tackle this peculiarity, I employ the approach used by Raphael and Winter-Ebmer
(2001) and Kapuscinski et al. (1998). Namely, Kapuscinski et al. (1998) find that when
female employment is added to the model, homicide rates assume positive significant
effects, unlike in the baseline model. When female unemployment is included along with
the aggregate, no significant effect of unemployment on any category of violent crime is
found. However, when using female unemployment instead of the aggregate, the results
from Table 4 stay roughly the same. Interestingly, for rape and murder crimes, the num-
ber of policemen has also the opposite effect of those found for property crimes. This
is probably due to the higher reporting propensity when the number of police officers is
higher, especially in the murder attempt and rape attempt categories. Significant and
strong negative effect on rape is found for average income: when deflated real wage is
increased by 1 percent, number of rapes and rape attempts per 10,000 inhabitants is
decreased by 0.81 percent.
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Table 4: Results of Baseline Specification for Violent Crimes
Dependent variable:
Total violent Murder Rape Serious injury
Unemployment −0.3044∗∗∗ −0.2764∗∗∗ 0.0896∗ −0.2407∗∗
(0.1098) (0.0637) (0.0516) (0.1099)
Clear-up rate 0.2404 0.0593 0.0042 −0.7396
(0.4258) (0.1257) (0.0561) (0.5497)
Infant mortality −0.0483∗ −0.0442 0.0102 −0.0423
(0.0292) (0.0602) (0.0414) (0.0369)
Divorces 0.0525 −0.0162 0.0943∗∗ 0.0552
(0.0554) (0.0480) (0.0404) (0.0665)
Police −0.0236 0.2238∗∗∗ 0.1341∗ −0.1835
(0.0983) (0.0816) (0.0690) (0.1284)
Drug abuse 0.0539 0.0248 0.0205 0.0348
(0.0339) (0.0226) (0.0197) (0.0432)
Average income 0.0979 −0.2592 −0.8146∗∗ 0.7106
(0.6833) (0.5205) (0.3304) (0.7074)
Tourist overnight 0.0423 −0.0006 0.0427 0.0233
(0.0380) (0.0406) (0.0262) (0.0339)
Observations 320 318 295 320
Adjusted R2 0.0451 0.0520 0.0581 0.0465
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant
at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%. Fixed effects and year dummies are included in
all specifications. The hypotheses that all fixed effects are equal to zero and
that all time effects are equal to zero are rejected for all specifications. For
murder and rape unbalanced panels were estimated because for certain years
it was impossible to compute the clear-up rates due to unavailable data.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Croatian Bureau of Statis-
tics, Croatian Employment Service and Ministry of the Interior.
Again, I proceed with the estimation of these effects including the linear and quadratic
trend to test the sensitivity of obtained results. The results are presented in Table 5.
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Table 5: Effect of Unemployment on Violent Crimes, Sensitivity Analysis
Model:
Crime Baseline Linear Linear and quadratic
Aggregate violent −0.3044∗∗∗ −0.3129∗∗∗ −0.3502∗∗∗
(0.1098) (0.1151) (0.1055)
Murder −0.2764∗∗∗ −0.2887∗∗∗ −0.2956∗∗∗
(0.0637) (0.0621) (0.0692)
Rape 0.0896∗ 0.0911∗ 0.0790∗
(0.0516) (0.0524) (0.0475)
Serious injury −0.2407∗ −0.2529∗∗ −0.2927∗∗∗
(0.1099) (0.1175) (0.1066)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗significant at 10%,
∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%. Fixed effects and year dum-
mies are included in all specifications. The hypotheses that all fixed
effects are equal to zero and that all time effects are equal to zero are
rejected for all specifications. All estimations include the same set of
covariates as the baseline specification.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Croatian Bureau of
Statistics, Croatian Employment Service and Ministry of the Interior.
While the results obtained for property crimes suggest at least partial support of the
theory of economics of crime, the results for all violent crimes bar rapes are counter-
intuitive, but at the same time similar to those obtained by Raphael and Winter-Ebmer
(2001). Interpreting these results without caution might lead to the false conclusion
that unemployment makes people more placid. Still, the explanation offered by Raphael
and Winter-Ebmer (2001) makes more sense: there is some violence-creating factor that
varies systematically with unemployment rates which is not accounted for by the model
specification. One such factor, the same authors note, could be the greater frequency of
interactions between potential victims and offenders when more people are working.
Following the logic of Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), if women are scarcely among
the offenders, the negative relationship between violent crimes must be attributable to
factors other than a criminal behavioural response by women. On the state level, fe-
male offenders account for 10 percent of aggregated violent crimes while the data on the
county level are not available. Hence, if the results using female unemployment reflect
the same relationship as aggregate unemployment levels, the estimation suffers from
16
omitted-variable bias. As mentioned in the third section, the results of the same models
from Table 4 with female unemployment indeed parallel those obtained with aggregate
levels of unemployment which points to the omitted-variable problem. The difference
in comparison with the results of Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) is that even in the
original specification the estimated coefficient for rape crimes is positive. Moreover, it
is robust across specifications. This might suggest that the impact of unemployment on
rape crimes is more obvious than the one obtained by Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001).
Crutchfield (1989) suggests an alternative explanation. The nature of different crimes
might influence the variation in the effects pattern. Murder and assault which results
in serious body injuries often occur when the victim and the assailant know each other,
while the same cannot be said about rape crimes. As Crutchfield (1989) notes, rape
crimes might be less the result of passionate acute anger than murders or assaults, and
more of the chronic anger and desperation associated with unemployment. This argu-
ment is in line with the one about greater frequency of interaction. More interaction
means more people will get to know each other, which could also lead to more arguments
between people and result in more murder attempts, murders and serious body injuries.
However, it is again important to acknowledge the poor goodness of fit measure, i.e., R2
in all specifications is below 6 percent. This goes in line with the earlier observation that
the unobserved explanatory variable, cn, might explain the largest portion of variation
in both violent and property crimes.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyses the relationship between unemployment and crime in Croatia at
the county level. The expected positive and significant relationship that is robust across
specifications is found only for grand larceny in the property crimes category, and for
rape and rape attempts in the violent crimes category. Several explanations for the
unusual results are given.
First, the family safety-net and opportunities to work in Western Europe, especially for
low-skilled labour, serve as shock absorbers if a person is laid-off or is job-searching for
a long time. Second, high unemployment and long-term unemployment inherent to the
Croatian economy have inured people to these otherwise difficult conditions. This could
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be the reason why the deepest and longest economic crisis since sovereignty did not re-
sult in increased crime rates. Third, with regards to violent crimes, the negative effect of
unemployment on all violent crimes bar rape could be attributed to (i) omitted variable
bias and (ii) greater frequency of interactions when more people are working. Fourth,
as the title of the paper suggests, the explanatory power of unemployment of variations
in crime rates is modest. Hence, there is some other, more important underlying factor
that has an effect on crime rates, and I argue that this could be the unobserved psycho-
logical cost of committing a crime.
Another interesting result is that the size of the police force negatively impacts grand
larceny and positively impacts murders and rapes, and attempts. This makes sense be-
cause a larger police force discourages property crimes owing to a greater probability
of getting caught. On the other hand, the size of the police force hardly discourages
murders and rapes since they are rarely economically motivated and therefore the prob-
ability of getting caught has smaller impact in the whether-to-commit-a-crime-calculus.
The positive sign can be interpreted through larger reporting propensities when more
police officers are employed.
The research presented here also has some limitations. First, the data for number of
inhabitants are taken for census years only (2001 and 2011). Hence, the computed ratios
per 10,000 inhabitants were computed with inherent standard errors. The data of census
2001 are applied for years 1998-2006, and of 2011 for years 2007-2013. Since the number
of inhabitants is a variable that changes significantly only in the long term, the results
should not be influenced too much by this. Second, an extensive list of demographic
structure covariates on the county level is missing. Again it is difficult to expect that
by including these controls the results would change substantially. Nevertheless, it is
important to recognize these data limitations. To confirm or disregard the results of the
conducted analysis, it would be useful to create population projections and estimate the
models with projections instead of approximation by censuses.
Future research should shed more light onto the relationship between unemployment and
crime in countries with common historical, cultural, geographical and economic features.
For example, a suggested line of research could be to conduct mirrored analyses in similar
countries with consistently high unemployment rates. Neighbouring Serbia would be an
appropriate case study. Further, it would be useful to conduct qualitative research by
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interviewing the offenders in Croatia. It is the only way to demystify the psychological
cost of committing a crime which is posited in the paper as the main explanatory variable
of crime in Croatia.
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